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Summary findings
China's performance in economic growth and poverty  the population aged 15 to 64) was quite rapid and
reduction has been remarkable. There is an ongoing  contributed significantly to growth and welfare.
debate about whether this growth is mainly driven by  After incorporating human capital, they also find that
productivity or factor accumulation. But few past studies  the growth of total factor productivity still plays a
had incorporated  information on China's human capital  positive and significant role during the reform period. In
stock, and thus contained an omission bias.  contrast, productivity growth was negative in the pre-
Wang and Yao construct a measure of China's human  reform period. The results are robust to changes in labor
capital stock from 1952 to 1999 and, using a simple  shares in GDP.
growth accounting exercise, incorporate it in their  The recent declining rate of human capital
analysis of the sources of growth during the pre-reform  accumulation is a cause for concern, if China is to sustain
(1952-77)  and the reform period (1978-99).  its improvements in growth and welfare in the coming
They find that the accumulation of human capital in  decade. Funding for basic education is unevenly
China (as measured by the average years of schooling for  distributed and insufficient in some poor regions.
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"Ask what has been the most stunning economic event of the past century,
and many people might  cite the case of China in the two decades since it
opened up. In that time the economy has grown more than fivefold, incomes
have quadrupled, and 270m Chinese have been lifted out of absolute poverty.
Yet  with  a  couple  more  decades'  hindsight,  that achievement  might  be
superseded  by  what  may  now  be  about  to  happen  in  the  world's  most
populous country  . The coming two decades, on the other hand, offer the
possibility of an even more extraordinary  pace of economic change."
The Economist,
March  I0h, 2001.  p.23
1. Introduction
Few  would  deny  China's  extraordinary growth  performance,  but  the  sources  and
sustainability of  this  growth  have  been the  subject  of  heated  debate.  This  paper
contributes to this debate by investigating the determinants of China's growth during the
period of 1952-1999 using a  simple growth accounting framework which incorporates
human capital stock.  By constructing a measure of human capital stock and comparing
the growth experiences of the pre-reform and reform period, we try to shed light on the
relative importance of factor accumulation (physical capital, labor and human capital)
versus the growth of total factor productivity (TFP).
There is an on-going debate about whether China's rapid and sustained growth during the
reform period after 1978 is mainly driven by productivity or factor accumulation.'  On
the one side, the literature (e.g. Chow, 1993; Borensztein and Ostry, 1996; Hu and Khan,
1Heated debate  initiated  by Young  (1995)  on the source  of growth  in East Asian  economies  has spurred  a
growing  literature  on this subject.  The author  contends  that the so-called  "East Asian  Miracle"  is a myth
because  the engine  driving  the spectacular  growth  was fueled  essentially  by capital  accumulation  instead  of
total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth.
-1-1997) has reached a consensus on the fundamental sources of China's rapid growth. In
particular, Chow concludes 2 that capital formation played a principle role in  China's
economic growth while there was nearly no technological progress from 1952 to  1980.
However for the reform period since 1978, two growth accounting studies (Borensztein
and Ostry, 1996; Hu and Khan, 1997) show that productivity has become the primary
driving force of China's  rapid economic growth. For example, Borensztein and Ostry
(1996) find that the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP), which was negative
before reform,  rose to an average 3.8 percent per year in the post-reform period when it
accounted for more than one-third of the total increase in output.
One the other side, Krugman (1994) has argued that, similar to the East Asian tigers,
China will soon face a limit on growth since it depends heavily on a massive increase in
inputs with only small improvement in productivity. Moreover, Young (2000) concludes
that the productivity performance of China's non-agricultural economy during the reform
period is respectable, but not  outstanding. More specifically, he  finds that systematic
understatement of inflation by enterprises accounts for 2.5% growth per annum in the
non-agricultural economy during the reform period (1978-1998). The usual suspects, i.e.
rising participation rates, improvements in  educational attainment, and the transfer of
labor out of agriculture, account for most of the remainder. As such, it is possible to
transform the  recent  growth  experience  of China  from  the  "extraordinary"  into  the
"mundane".
This  study  takes  a  small  step  forward  by  (i)  measuring  the  human  capital  more
accurately, and (ii) taking advantage of improved China data in the recent  years and
estimate the sources of growth with less errors. First, we construct an annual variable of
human capital stock for  1952-1999. The variable, educational attainment for population
age 15-64, provides an annual measure of the human capital stock for the labor force
during the pre-reform and the reform period. We build our human capital stock based on
number of graduates at different schooling levels, rather than quinquenial data based on
enrollment rates in Barro and Lee (2000) or Nehru, Swanson and Dubey (1995).3  By
contrast, the studies of Chow (1993), Borensztein and Ostry (1996) and Hu and Khan
(1997) do  not  incorporate  human capital  as  an  input  in  their  aggregate production
functions  for  the  Chinese  economy.  Due  to  this  reason,  their  measurements  of
productivity suffer from an omission bias and the estimated productivity as residual is
exaggerated by the absence of human capital from the growth-accounting calculations.
Moreover,  Young's  (2000)  estimation  of human  capital  growth  has  several  notable
shortcomings.  In particular, he disaggregates the labor force into various categories based
on infrequent  census data of population. In addition, each type of worker is weighted by
the wage of that type based on the Household Survey files over a sub-sample period
1986-1992. Therefore, the obtained human capital growth is not an annual growth rate
Chow (1993)  estimates production  functions  for China's  aggregate economy  and  for five  sectors:
agriculture, industry, construction, transportation. and commerce--using annual data (some constructed by
the author) from 1952 to 1980.
3Our  method avoids the problems of over-estimation due to high dropout and repeat rates which are often
unreliable or under-reported. Independently, Wang 2000 developed a human capital stock using a different
method than ours.
-2-and also cannot cover his whole sample period 1978-1998. This runs the risk of out-of-
sample bias in the aggregated human capital series.
Second, the data used in this study is updated based on Hsueh and Li (1999) which is
more reliable.  A major issue of the previous studies relates to possible measurement
error,  including  problems  with  the  deflators  used  to  measure real  output  and  real
investment. The main problem has to do with the possible underdeflation of industrial
output in the collective sector and the lack of an investment price index. Fortunately,
Hsueh  and  Li  (1999)  provide a  modified  national  income  account  based  on  their
comprehensive review of Chinese national income accounting methodology and price
indexes.  In particular, Hsueh and Li  (1999) make a great effort to improve the GDP
deflator and investment deflator. In addition, previous studies rely on the self-estimated
labor share by combining wage and employment data. Hsueh and Li (1999) provide data
on provincial level compensation of labor as a percentage of provincial GDP for the
reform period 1978-1995. To derive the aggregate share of labor, we simply need to take
the average of provincial labor shares.
We find that first, the accumulation of human capital was quite rapid and it contributes
significantly to  growth  and welfare.  Second, after incorporating human capital, the
growth of total factor productivity still plays a positive and significant role during the
reform period 1978-1999, in contrast to the negative productivity growth during the pre-
reform period 1952-1977. Regarding the on-going debate, this paper proposes a middle-
road answer to the sources of growth, and that is, both productivity growth and factor
accumulation are very significant in accounting for China's  growth performance during
the reform period.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the growth accounting
method. Section 3 is devoted to the data and measurement issues with a focus on how to
construct the human capital stock. Section 4 details how we construct the human capital
series.  Section 5  discusses the results of  growth accounting and  also provides  some
sensitivity analysis on the results. Section 6 summarizes our findings and implications.
2. Methodology of Growth Accounting
Growth  accounting essentially  divides output growth  into  a  component that  can  be
explained by  input growth, and  a  'residual'  which  captures changes in  productivity.
Consider the following aggregate production function for the Chinese economy:
Y  =A  Kl-a(L  H  )a
t  t  t  t  t  (1)
where Yt is real GDP, At is total factor productivity, Kt is the real capital stock, Lt is total
employment, Ht  is average schooling years of population age 14-65 and represents human
-3-capital stock. Hence LtHt  is  a skill-adjusted measure of labor input. Taking logs and
differentiating totally both sides of equation (1)  yields
A  A  A
a, = g , - (1 - ax)  k , - at(l, +h, )  (2)
where at is growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), gt is the growth rate of real GDP,
the lowercase variables with a  "hat" correspond to the growth rates of the uppercase
variables described in equation (1). Equation (2) decomposes the growth rate of output
into growth of TFP, and a weighted average of the growth rates of physical capital stock
and  skill-augmented labor.  Under the  assumption of  constant returns to  scale, these
weights are given by the shares of these two inputs in aggregate output. TFP was called
"measure  of  our  ignorance"  by  Abramovitz  (1956).  It  covers  many  components:
innovation-based technology  progress, imitation-led technology progress, institutional
change, efficiency change, omitted variables and measurement errors. TFP should not be
equated with innovation-based technology change, although it often is. It is important to
note that the decomposition of equation (2) remains valid under more general functional
forms of the production function such as the translog production function used by Hu and
Khan (1997) and Young (2000)4. The interpretation of the weights assigned to physical
capital and skill-augmented labor as their share in  aggregate output requires only the
assumption of constant returns to scale. The Cobb-Douglas production function is chosen
for simplicity.
According to equation (2), therefore, any errors in measuring the variables, errors due to
omission of relevant inputs, will directly spill over into the measure of TFP. In addition,
the production function parameters are central to the decomposition of output growth into
contributions from physical capital, labor and productivity. If these sources of bias are
successfully removed,  the  remaining  portion  of  output growth  unexplained  by  the
combined rate of growth of all the inputs of production is the measure of "true" TFP.
Despite all these possible flaws, this residual still is the work horse of empirical growth
analysis. For example, the TFP residual  is central to  the recent debate  on the "New
Economy". A significant proportion of  this  paper, as we  shall see  in  the  following
sections, is devoted to reducing these biases. The next section describes the series Yt, Kt,
Lt  and Ht.
3. Data and Measurement Issues
During the pre-reform period of  1952-77, the  Chinese statistical  system adopted the
system of material product balances (MPS). The making of MPS was tailored to meet the
needs of the central planning economy. The main aggregate indicators were total output
value of society 5 and national income. National income is value-added and comparable
with GDP in the system of national accounts (SNA) adopted by the market-economy
4It  should also be clear that conventional growth accounting, imputing output elasticities based on market
rewards, will not shed any light on the possible extent of externalities.
5This  is obtained by summing up gross output values and suffers from the double-accounting problem.
-4-countries. But national income does not account for the value-added of the service sector.
Since the adoption of the comprehensive reform policy in 1978, China's statistical system
has had to follow the international norm. Starting in 1985, SSB has received financial aid
from  the  World Bank  and  the Asian Development Bank  for further  developing the
national  income  accounts  system,  particularly  for  the  estimation  of  GDP  and  its
components in  SNA  and to  make up  the deficiency of  MPS. SNA  was completely
implemented in the whole nation in 1992.
Previously, data on China's  growth were usually compiled from three kinds of Chinese
official statistics publications, (A) China Statistics Yearbook from  1981 to  1997 (issue
1982 is  absent); (B)  China Historical  Statistics  1949-1989; and  (C)  Comprehensive
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China 1949-1998.  However, three
shortcomings of the above data have plagued the empirical work. First, there was no
national GDP during the pre-reform period. As a result, the previous studies on China's
national economy have used NI for the pre-reform period. Second, there was no national
NI deflator to deflate NI for the pre-reform period 1952-77. Finally, there was no national
investment deflator for the period 1952-1990. The SSB began to construct the fixed asset
investment price index in 1991.
With the support and cooperation of the SSB, Hsueh and Li (1999) have made significant
progresses and published the most complete set of Chinese national income from 1952 to
1995 based  on  SNA  in  1999 both  at the  national and provincial  level. Their main
contributions include the following. (1) Based on historical statistical data stored in SSB
and  existing NI  data, they fill  up  the  service sector omitted in  MIPS of  China and
construct GDP data for the pre-reform period 1952-77, which are directly comparable
with those of the reform period  1978-95; (2) They provide real GDP, the investment
growth rate and the corresponding deflators for the period 1952-95.
Output
Our data set covers a 48-year period (1952-1999). National GDP data and implicit GDP
deflator come from the Hsuech-Li (1999) data set, covering the period 1952-95. GDP
data and  implicit GDP deflator  from  1996 to  1999 are drawn from  China Statistics
Yearbook 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. We take  1995 as the base year to generate real
GDP.
Capital Stock
To  estimate the real capital stock for the aggregate economy each year, the standard
perpetual inventory approach is used. Hsuech-Li data set provides national investment
from 1952 to 1995. Investment is referred to gross fixed capital formation at the current
price. The calculation of gross fixed capital formation is based on the total social fixed
asset investment6. Investment data from  1996 to  1999 is drawn from China Statistics
Yearbook 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
6 The ownership  structure  of investment  is dramatically  different  between  the pre-reform  period and the
reform period. For the pre-reform period, the investment is dominated by state-owned investment. During
-5-The lack of physical capital deflator is a major issue of Chinese statistics because the
standard Chinese  statistical sources  do not  report the price  index of the  fixed asset
investment until 1991. The investment deflator used by Hu and Khan (1997) is drawn
from three sources: For the pre-reform period 1952-1977, they use the implicit deflator
for capital accumulation estimated by Chow (1993); for the period 1978-1990, they adopt
the price series of building materials as a proxy; For the period 1991-1994, they use the
official fixed asset investment index. A major shortcoming of Hu and Khan's investment
deflator is that the building materials price is unlikely to be a good proxy for the fixed
asset investment. Alternatively, Young (2000) construct an implicit fixed asset formation
deflator as a residual between GDP deflator and the deflators of other components of
GDP including private consumption, government consumption, inventories and import
and  export.  However,  the  inherent  risk  of  Young's  complex  method  is  that  any
measurement errors of the deflators of GDP, consumption, government consumption,
inventories and import and export can pass on to Young's "residual" investment deflator.
Fortunately, Hsueh and Li provide an implicit investment deflator for the period 1952-
1995. Hsueh and  Li  (1999) take  the  data  from  the  Annual  Report of  Statistics  on
Investment in Fixed Assets. Prices of investment are determined by taking the weighted
average  of  prices  of  machinery  and  equipment,  and  prices  of  construction  and
installation. The prices of investment have faced  significant changes only  after 1978.
Within the pre-reform period 1952-1977, the prices of investment including construction
materials for building houses and other buildings, and machinery and equipment, are
basically controlled by the state, and there was no significant change. After 1978, as the
pricing  of production means was  becoming  decentralized, the  prices of construction
materials  and  machinery  equipment  increased  significantly.  SSB  formally  started
compiling a price index for fixed asset investment in 1991. This price index has existed
since 1991. Combining Hsueh and Li's  index from  1952-1995 and SSB's  index from
1996 to  1999, we can get real investment for the period 1952 to  1999. The investment
deflator takes the prices of 1995 as 100%.
To construct a time series of capital stock from 1952-1999, we need to know the average
depreciation rate of capital and its initial level. According to the Perkins' (1988) method,
the overall depreciation rate is 5%. An initial value of 175 billion Yuan is set for the
aggregate capital stock in  1952 (at 1952 prices), the estimate used by Chow (1993) and
Hu and Khan (1997)7.
Quantity and Quality of Labor
The sources of the Chinese labor statistics are annual administrative and survey-based
8 estimates and the infrequently conducted population censuses ,which are reported in the
the reform  period, however, investment includes  investment of  state-owned enterprises, investment of
private firms and joint-ventures and Foreign Direct Investment.
An alternative way to calculate the initial capital stock in is set to 3 times National Income in 1951, which
can be drawn from Hsuech-Li-Liu (1993) data set.
8 China conducted its first population census in 1954, subsequently, censuses were conducted in 1964, 1982
and 1990.
-6-China Statistical Yearbook. The SSB, using departmental reports and surveys, collected
data on the "Total Labor Force of Society". Referring to the working population, this
series has a fairly stringent definition of employment requiring, for example, that young
people in cities and towns with temporary employment earn, as a minimum, the wage
level of local grade-one workers in order to be included in the series.
In this paper, we use the data series on the Total Labor Force of Society to measure the
labor input. Young (2000) shows that the overall growth of the working population is
perfectly consistent with reasonable demographic and participation data. The Labor Force
of  Society data indicate  a substantial  movement of labor out  of  agriculture into the
industrial  and  service  sectors  of  the  economy. 9 For  example,  labor  force  growth
substantially exceeds the growth of the population.
While the Labor Force of Society data series provides a reasonable measure of the overall
growth of the labor force, it does not contain any information on the quality of workers,
that  is, changes in  human capital  stock  over time.  In  analyzing the  contribution of
changes in educational attainment to the quality of labor, there are two approaches to
measure the quality of labor force. One approach is to disaggregate the labor forcc-by
level of schooling, and often by other available characteristics such as age and gender.
Changes in the number of employees at each level of schooling are then weiglhted by
their marginal products,  proxied by the mean income associated with  each schooling
level, to give the overall change in an index of 'effective' or quality-adjusted labor. This
ultimately allows the researcher to quantify the proportion of output growth that can be
directly attributed to increases in educational attainment. 10 The calculation of the labor
quality index assumes that differences in  market rewards are interpreted as reflecting
genuine differences in marginal products.
The second approach is to use educational attainment as a proxy for the component of the
human capital stock obtained at schools (Barro and Lee, 2000). A higher educational
attainment indicates higher quality  of workers. So far  there  have been a  number of
attempts to measure educational attainment across countries. Earlier empirical studies
used school enrollment ratios or literacy rates.  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) used
the proportion of the adult population enrolled in secondary school as a proxy for human
capital investment. Romer (1990) considers literacy a proxy for human capital stock and
uses the change in the literacy rate. However, there are some conceptual difficulties with
the use of school enrollment data for two reasons. First, these measures do not adequately
measure the aggregate stock of human capital available contemporaneously as an input to
production process". In addition, in many empirical growth papers, it is not clear whether
9 The migration  of  labor out of agriculture is an essential feature of economic development  and
modernization,  both  historically  in  developed  countries  and currently  in developing  ones.
10 A prominent example is Jorgenson, Gollop  and Fraumeni's (1987) aggregate index of labor quality based
on  changes  in the composition  of  total hours  worked by  age,  sex, education,  employment class  and
occupation. Due to the data availability limit, however, nearly all the studies which carry out a detailed
disaggregation by level of schooling are restricted to the United States.
Temple (2000) emphasizes on the vocational training as another important aspect of human capital.
-7-school enrollment rates are intended to represent a flow of investment in human capital,
or its stock.  It is incorrect to use enrollment as a stock variable.
As far as the first approach is concerned, it is difficult to apply it in the Chinese economy
to obtain an annual quality index of labor during the pre-reform period and reform period.
One main reason is that the published data on the relative labor incomes of  Chinese
workers by worker characteristic are basically non-existent. However, some survey data
of  the  SSB's  Urban  Household Survey  and  the  Household  Survey  by  the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences contains information on the characteristics and individual
labor income  of the  members of the survey  households for  certain periods  (see for
example, Wang 1996). Young (2000) utilizes several household survey data of the SSB
for the incomplete reform period 1986-1992 to arrive at a rough estimation of human
capital  growth  during  the whole  reform period  1978-98 by  using the re'lative wage
estimates to  weight the changing composition of the labor. He finds that the Chinese
workers'  wages  rise  with  educational attainment  at  a  slower rate  than in  the other
economies. Nonetheless, the survey files of the SSB for the years  1986-1992 and the
Household Survey conducted by the  Chinese Academy of Social Science  are by  no
m-ieans  a balanced sample (e.g. some provinces are not represented, while the samples arc
heavily biased towards better educated households).
As a result, we adopt the second approach in the present study and use average schooling
years of population aged between 15-65 as an approximation of the quality change of
labor force  for the  entire  period  1952-1999. The  next  section summarizes the  main
procedures -for  constructing the human capital stock series.
4. Human Capital Stock of China
Development of China's Education
Education begins with kindergarten (ages 3-6) and continues with primary (ages 6-12)
and  secondary education  (ages  12-18), which  includes junior  and  senior  secondary
schools,  specialized  secondary  schools,  vocational  schools,  and  technical  training
schools.  Higher  education,  which  includes  universities  and  colleges  as  well  as
postgraduate programs, requires 4-5 years for a B.A. degree, 7-8 years for a Masters
degree, and 10-11 years for a Ph.D.
Around 70% of China's  population were without formal schooling after World War II
(1937-1945) and  the  civil  war  (1945-1949). In  the  1950s, there was  a  widespread
movement  to  eradicate  illiteracy.  In  the  1960s,  the  implementation  of  an
obligatory/mandatory nine-year education policy began. This policy called for six years
in primary school and three years in junior secondary school. While the implementation
of this policy has been consistent in urban areas, it did not materialize in rural regions in
terms  of  financial  assistance. The  enrollment  growth  at  the  primary  level  is  slow
compared to other levels because the coverage at this level was already extensive for a
long time. Slower growth in enrollment in primary education also stems from declines in
birth rates since 1970s and a reduction in dropout and repetition rates that reduced the
-8-proportion of students in the primary school-age range.  By the mid-1990s, China had
achieved virtually universal enrollment in primary education, but the quality vary a great
deal.  Only two-thirds of primary school students currently complete their entire primary
cycle.  In some remote and poor regions, completion rates were as low as 30 percent.
Nonetheless, the percentage of no schooling has declined from 51.8% in  1964 to 16% in
1995.
At secondary level, gross enrollment rates rose progressively but both enrollment rates
and growth at this and the tertiary level remained low, relative to those of other Asian
countries. Although government policies during the Great Leap Forward period created
better  educational  opportunities  for  working  class  and  peasants,  famine  and  social
conflict in the early 1960s thwarted that momentum. During the Cultural Revolution, all
universities were closed between 1966 and the early 1970s in favor of several short-term
training courses. Regular enrollment was restored in 1976, but China had already lagged
behind Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and  other Asian countries in terms of  age cohort
participation rates in higher education. In addition, completion rates are particularly low
among poor regions and female students at the secondary level, many families lack the
incentive-  to  send their  children in school, due  largely to4-sboth  economic and cultural
factors.
At the tertiary level, however, coverage is extremely low. China does lag behind other
countries regarding some dimensions of educational progress. For instance, its rate of
enrollmnent  particularly in higher education is below both the average among all Asian
countries and the rates found in some low-income countries.
Methodology
Using a perpetual inventory method, Barro and Lee (2000) construct a measure of human
capital stock. Their data set comprises at least one observation for  142 economies, of
which 107 have complete information at five-year intervals from  1960 to  2000. The
percentage  of  the  population  who  have  successfully  completed  a  given  level  of
schooling-say  secondary, tertiary, or post-primary schooling-is  a straightforward way
to show the population's attainment of skills and knowledge associated with a particular
level of education.12  With these data they can construct measures of average years of
schooling at all levels for each country, which is taken as the human capital stock series.
Following Barro and Lee (2000), the perpetual inventory method is adopted in this paper.
The subsequent question is how to choose flow variables to the human capital stock. The
distribution data  of  educational attainment  by  age  cohort in  the  aggregate Chinese
population are only infrequently recorded in the 1990 censuses, the 1987, 1995 and 1999
1% Sample Population Surveys, and the 1997 Survey on Population Change.  Thus, we
use new school graduates as flows that are added to the human capital stocks annually.
12 In practice, however, each cycle of education has significant variation in duration across countries. They
also take account of this variation by using information on the typical duration of each level of schooling
within countries.
-9-The  number  of  graduates reflects  the  inflows of  new  school  graduates  to  existing
educational  stock more accurately than the enrollment ratios used by Barro  and Lee
(2000). In the construction of average years of schooling, we take account of changes of
national school duration over time.
The initial figure of human capital stock in 1951 is 0.84 years of schooling per person,
which  is  estimated  based  on  the  following  schooling  distribution  assumptions:  in
1951, 72%  of  the  population  were  illiterate,  16%  had  incomplete  primary,  8.4%
completed primary, 2.7% had incomplete secondary, 0.1% completed high school, the
rest were  for higher education,  about 0.6%. These assumptions are based  on India's
education attainment distribution in  1960 from Barro and Lee data (1997, 2000). Given
the population aged over  15-65 in  1951, we obtain the estimate of average schooling
years  in  1951. The  data  report  educational  attainments  in  the  population  in  five
categories: primary, junior  secondary school,  senior  secondary school  (high school),
specialized secondary school (vocational school) and tertiary education. For these five
categories, number of schooling years are 5, 8, 11, 12, 14.5, respectively. 13
Dased on the perpetual inventory method, we construct current flo.w3  of adult popuilation
that are added to the stocks of the previous year. The data of annual graduates form the
six schooling levels comes from "Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50
Years of New China 1949-1998".
The formulas for the varioIIs  levels of schooling for the total population are as follows.
H1,  t  =  (I - S )HI,,- 1 + (PRI, - JUNIOR,+3  ) .............................  . ...........................  (3)
H 2t1 (1-  S1 )H 2, 1-1 + (JUNIOR,  - SENIOR,+3  - SPECIAL,1 2  )  . .(4)
H3, 1 = (1- St )H3 ,t- I  + (SENIOR,  - HIGH t+3 5 )  --.-.. (5)
H4, 1 =  (1-Se  )H4,t-I +  SPECIALt  ..  ............................  (6)
H5 ,t =(1  -)H5,,- 1 +HIGH  . ...........................................  (7)
where Hjt is the  number of graduates for  whom j  is  the highest level  of  schooling
attained; j=1 for primary, 2 for junior secondary school, 3 for senior secondary school, 4
for specialized secondary school and  5 for tertiary. If  a person cannot  complete the
enrolled duration level and thus drops out  from it, we take him as a graduate of the
schooling level he had before. For example, a drop-out of the senior secondary school is
13  Tertiary  education includes  university  and  junior  college education.  Depending  on  different  time
periods, it usually takes a total of 15-16 years to complete a four-year university and takes 14-15 years to
complete a three-year junior college. We take 14.5 as the number of schooling years for people who were
reported as having completed tertiary education in China.
40taken  as  a  graduate of  the junior  secondary school.  Since the  national duration  of
different schooling levels are known, we can obtain the net number of graduates at each
schooling level. The variable 8°  is the annual mortality rate of the population and is drawn
from "Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China 1949-
1998" and China Statistical Yearbook 2000.
The  application  of  equations  (3)-(7)  generates  our  panel  data  set  on  educational
attainment for the population from 1952 to 1999 at the five broad levels of schooling:
primary, junior secondary, senior secondary, specialized secondary and tertiary.
ht  =(5*H 1 +8*H 2 +11*H 3 +10*H 4 +14.5*H 5)/ Pop  (8)
where ht is the human capital stock and represents the quality of employment at year t.
Pop is the population aged between 15-64 taken from the World Bank data base. 14 These
data  on  the  distribution  of  educational  attainment  at  different  levels  among  the
population, combined with the information on the national duration of school at each
level.generate the number of years of schooling achieved by the average person.
Figure 1 shows the obtained human capital stock series over the period 1952-1999. One
can see that on average the accumulation of human capital has been quite rapid over the
years. There was a slow down in the 1960s and a sharp increase of the human capital
stock for the period 1976-1980, reflecting the recovery from the total breakdown of the
education system caused by the "Culture Revolution"  1966-1976, to a normal education
system.
[See Figure 1]
However, these data have a number of shortcomnings.  First, the data may underestimate
the "true"  human capital stock because we only take the graduates as the flow to the
corresponding schooling stock. The additional schooling years of those who dropped out
do not count. Second, the measure of educational attainment does not take account of the
skills and  experiences gained by  individuals  after their formal education. Third, the
measure does not take account of differences in the quality of schooling cross regions and
over time. In particular, the quality of education during the Culture Revolution period
was rather poor but education completed in those years was treated the same as in other
years. Nonetheless, our estimates of educational attainment provide a reasonable proxy
for the stock of human capital for the pre-reform period 1952-77 and the reform period
1978-99.
Labor Share
The last problem comes from trying to estimate the share of national income attributable
to capital and the share attributable to labor. Chow (1993) used a value of 0.40 for the
14  The World  Bank  data on population  aged between  15-64  starts  from 1960.  We use the same  proportion
of this cohort  in the whole  population  to project  the data from 1952-1959.
41-period 1952-1980.  The labor shares estimated by Hu and Khan (1997) is 0.386 and 0.453
for the pre-reform period 1952-1978 and the reform period 1979-1994, respectively. The
study by Li and others (1993) produced somewhat higher estimates for the labor income
share in China, with an average value of 0.462 for the pre-reform period 1952-1978 and
an average value of 0.536 for the reform period 1979-1994. The reason for Li and others'
(1993) higher share is that implicit housing subsidies (state-controlled rent) are included
in labor compensation. Such implicit housing subsidies are not included here for labor
compensation on the grounds that the imputed value of housing services is not counted
symmetrically as part of the aggregate value added in Chinese official statistics. Young
(2000) estimates the share attributable to labor using data and obtains a value of 0.60.
In this study, labor income is taken from the average labor remuneration across China's
28 provinces' 5 in the GDP data in Hsueh and Li's National Account (1999). The latter is
based on the primary distribution of the value-added created by the grassroots statistical
units, which contain (1) industries at town level and above, (2) industries at the village
level and below, and (3) urban or rural partnership and household industries.
(1)  For state-owned and  collective-owned industries at town  level  and  above,, labor
remuneration includes payablc wages of the current year, payable welfare funds .of the
current year, and labor and unemployment insurance expenses and the labor union fees.
(2) For industrial enterprise at village level and below, actual wages and welfare funds
are obtainable from various surveys of the SSB.
(3)  For  urban  and  rural  partnership  and  household  industrial  enterprise,  labor
remuneration is in two parts: owner's  iricome and employees' wages. The latter can be
derived or estimated by referring to the number of employees and their wages provided
under "Major Indicators of Urban and Rural Household Industry" in Annual Report of
Industrial Statistics. By contrast, the official national accounts impute labor income to the
self-employed,  assuming  that  where  self-employment  is  found  (e.g.  industry  and
construction), all income is labor income, and going so far as to conclude that the entire
output of some sectors, e.g. personal and social  services, contains no  capital income
component whatsoever, allocating all of the output of the sector between compensation of
employees and depreciation.
The overall economy-wide share of labor appears to remain about 0.5 over the entire
reform period 1978-99, and thus used in this study.  For the pre-reform period we adopt
the figure used by Chow (1993) and Hu and Khan (1997), which is 0.4. The increase of
labor share during the reform period relative to the pre-reform period is understandable
because there was a bias towards capital accumulation under the central-planning regime
before 1978.
5. Sources of Economic Growth
Table  1 summarizes the growth accounting results of the Chinese economy during the
pre-reform period 1952-1977 and the reform period 1978-1999. According to this table,
Hainan and Tibet are not included.
42in the pre-reform period 1953-1977, output grew at an annual average rate of 6.5 percent,
while in the reform period 1978-1999, output accelerated to 9.7 percent.
The contribution of physical capital remains the most important source of output growth,
with a 56.8% share for  the pre-reforrn period and with a 48.3% share for the reform
period. In particular, the growth rate of capital increased from 6.1 percent during the pre-
reform period to 9.4 percent during the reform period. As shown by Figure 2, a high and
rising saving rate is one of the most striking features of China during the reform period
1978-1999. In 1994, investment/GDP ratio reached an extraordinary 43 percent in 1994,
after which it declined slightly. No less important, the saving rate has been remarkably
stable. Contrast this with the collapse of saving in the transition economies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, the stability of the high saving rate is indeed notable
(the World Bank,  1997, and Kraay 2000). Although China's  saving performance sets it
apart from other transition economies, it fits more comfortably in the mold of other Asian
economies. For example, the investment/GDP ratio in Singapore, at 10 percent in 1960
had reached 39 percent by  1980 and an 47 percent by 1984, after which it fluctuated
around a value of about 40 percent (Young, 1995). Besides the domestic saving, foreign
direct- investment (FDI) is  another source of investment. China has already been the
world's  second-largest (prior to  1999) or the third-largest recipient (in  1999) of FDI,
behind US  ($1.1trillion) and  Britain ($394 billion),  and way  ahead of countries like
Brazil and Mexico that opened their mnarkets  much earlier than China.
[See Figure 2]
The growth rate of labor force during the reform period is roughly the same as that of the
pre-reformi  period. However, the fundamental sources of labor growth is different. During
the pre-refonn period, the growth of labor force was mainly driven by the rapid growth of
population.  By  contrast,  the  actual  population  growth  during  the  reform  period  is
dramatically lower than that of the pre-reform period due to the implementation of the
"One-Child policy" (Figure 3).
Figure 4 shows the dramatic changes in China's employment structure among industries.
The inter-sector transfer of labor is remarkable. Since  1978, surplus labor has moved
more rapidly from the rural to urban sector, from agriculture to other sectors such as the
construction and service sectors. This has provided an abundant supply of extraordinarily
cheap labor. In addition, the nonstate sector has been growing rapidly and attracting more
and more labor from the state and other sectors. This labor mobility has proven to be one
of the most important source of productivity gains (World Bank, 1997 and Kraay 1996).
[See Figure 3 and 4]
With regard to the contribution of human capital, the most striking change over time is
the decline in the annual growth rates of human capital stock, from 5.3 percent before the
reform to 2.7 percent during the reform period.  There are several possible reasons for
this dramatic slowdown. First, this may reflect the very low initial human capital stock
estimates in 1951. Second, the main education achievement during the pre-reform period
43.is the rapid expansion of primary education to the population, of which 80% was illiterate
before 1949. China's primary education has expanded rapidly during the pre-reform and
reform periods. The estimated enrollment rate16 of primary school was 25% in  1949
(World Bank, 1985) and increased to 84.3 percent in 1980. Figure 5 reveals that the net
enrollment rate of primary school reached 100 percent in 1996. Development of China's
secondary education during the pre-reform period and the reform period has been in some
ways even more impressive than that of primary education. In 1949, secondary schools
enrolled about 1.3 million students, corresponding to a gross enrollment ratio of only 2
percent, but by 1977 this figure had grown to 68 million, with a gross enrollment ratio of
about 46% (World Bank, 1985). Figure 5 shows that there is a steady increase of the net
enrollment ratio after a significant decline between 1980 and 1984. Despite China has a
wide education base  in  terms of primary  and  secondary education, the  apex of  the
education  pyramid  is  much  narrower  than  in  other  low-income  Asian  economies.
Opportunities for tertiary education is restricted to a very small portion of young adults.
The echoes of the Cultural Revolution will continue to be heard for some time. More than
a quarter of China's  university graduates between the ages of 25 and 64 are older than 50
and will have retired by 2010.
[See Figure 5]
With respect to education finance, insufficient and uneven funding for basic education is
a problem in China.  The cost of primary education such as teacher salaries is low, in
both absolute and relative terms (World Bank, 1985). China has considerably increased
fiscal spending on education in absolute terms during the reform period 1978-1999 but
nevertheless  devotes  a  much  smaller  share  of  GDP  to  education than  many  other
developing countries. Figure 6 shows the government education spending/GDP ratio has
fluctuated around 2.5 percent during the reform period.  Private financing of education
has been low but rising fast in the recent years to nearly 1 percent of GDP.  Detailed
analysis on regional disparities reveals that China's  successful fiscal decentralization may
have been associated with insufficient transfers to some poor provinces to support basic
education. 17 The distribution of educational funding is more skewed if the possibility of
private financing of education is taken into account.  In the coastal and richer provinces,
about 40% of education financing come from  the private  sector in  the recent  years.
Whereas, the poor provinces are more reliant on government financing (SSB, 2000. p.
665).
[See Figure 6]
The growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) rose from  a negative figure (-0.57
percent) in the pre-reform period to an average 2.3 percent per year in the reform period
when it accounts for  23.9 percent  of the total  output growth. This  implies that TFP
growth,  which  previously  contributed  little  to  output  growth  before  1978,  has
16 The net ratio  exclude,  but the gross  ratio includes,  under-  and over-age  students.
17  In another analysis, we found that the regional disparities  in educational  attainment  across China's
provinces  are rising  since 1995.  This  provides  further  evidence  that  fiscal transfers  to poor regions  are not
sufficient to support their investment in basic education (Wang and Yao, forthcoming).
4dramatically become  one  strong driving force  of China's  growth  during  the reform
period.
The rise of TFP growth is truly striking.  However, factor accumulation has still been
more magnificent than TFP growth, which is similar to the post-war growth of the Newly
Industrializing Countries of East Asia, i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea  and
Taiwan.  Research  by  Young  (1995)  has  generated  considerable  controversy  by
suggesting that productivity growth may have accounted for only a small fraction of the
growth of these East Asian economies, with capital accumulation being responsible for
the bulk of  it. Nonetheless, TFP growth has emerged as  one of  the most  important
sources of China's rapid growth during the reform period.18
Table 1: Sources of Economic Growth
(in percent)
Pre-reform  Period  Reform  Period
1953-77  1978-99
Labor S1  R e-2  0.40  Labor Share-0.50
Average Annual Growth Rate (%)
Output  6.46  9.72
Physical Capital Stock  6.11  __  9.39
Labor  Quantity  2.63  2.73
Human  Capital  Stock  5.30  2.69
TFP  -0.57  2.32
Contribution  to GDP growth by factor
Contribution  of physical  capital\a  56.8  48.3
Contribution  of labor  quantity\a  16.3  14.0
Contribution  of human  capital\a  32.8  13.8
Contribution  of productivity  growthV'  -5.9  23.9
Note:  This table reports  the growth  decomposition  corresponding  to equation  2.
a.  Ratio of input growth weighted  by the corresponding  factor income share, to GDP
growth.
b.  Ratio  of TFP growth  to GDP  growth.
Source:  Authors.
We now examine the  sensitivity of our TFP results. As explained earlier, we used a
higher labor share (0.5) in Table I since provincial level data show labor shares rose in
the reform period (Hsueh and Li 1999). The next table, Table 2, shows how TFP growth
estimates vary if  different  labor shares are used.  We select alternative labor  shares
ranging from 0.67 to 0.4.  We find that using alternative values for labor shares does not
18  Many factors may have led to the dramatic rise in TFP, including institutional reforms which provide
better incentives to people, opening up of the economy, and access to foreign trade and investment which
provide opportunities of learning by doing and techonological progress.  This has been the topics of many
other studies and will be further investigated by our next research using panel data analysis at provincial
level.
45.change the results significantly.  In particular, the differences in TFP growth between the
pre-reform and reform periods remain large, irrespective of the values chosen for the
labor share. Also, the estimated TFP growth during the reform period is resilient.
Table 2: Sensitivity Test: TFP growth using different labor shares
Alternative  Labor  Shares  Pre-reform  Period 1953-77  Reform  Period 1978-99
TFP Growth Rate (%)  TFP Growth Rate (%)
0.67  -0.87  2.98
0.60  -0.74  2.72
0.40  -0.38  1.92
Note: This table reports the TFP growth decomposition  corresponding  to different labor
shares.
6. Summary  and Implications
This paper investigates the change in the sources of economic growth during the reform
period 1978-1999 relative to that of the pre-reform period 1953-1977 by undertaking a
simple growth accounting exercise incorporating human capital.  This study makes a
small contribution to the methodology of constructing the human capital stock for China;
and shed light on the sources of growth with fewer omission errors.
First, as shown by Figure 1, the accumulation of human capital in China as measured by
the average years of schooling in population age 15-64, was quite rapid, and it contributes
significantly to  growth and  welfare. However,  the rate  of  growth of  human capital
declined significantly in the  reform period  in  1978-99, and  its  contribution to  GDP
growth is smaller compared to the pre-reform period.
Second, after incorporating human capital, the growth of total factor productivity still
plays a positive and significant role during the reform period 1978-1999, in contrast to
the negative productivity growth during the pre-reform period 1952-1977.  In addition,
this result is robust to changes in labor shares in GDP. Unlike both sides of the on-going
debate, this  paper proposes a middle-road answer to the sources of growth, i.e. both
productivity  growth  and  factor  accumulation  are  very  significant in  accounting for
China's growth performance during the reform period.
It is beyond this scope of this study to assess the growth possibilities of China in the
coming decade.  But based on our results, a few implications may be drawn which will be
supported by our next research. 19 First, because of the rapid expansion of capital base,
the relative importance of factor accumulation may be declining (the law of diminishing
returns), as shown in the relative contribution by factor inputs: In Table 1, contributions
19  Our next research  will be sources  of growth using data at the provincial  level, incorporating  human
capital  stock  and its distribution  across  province. Panel data analysis  will  be done using  GMM  method.
4  16by all factor inputs have declined in the reform period.  And total factor productivity
(TFP) growth becomes the driving force for China's growth perforrnance in the long run.
The potential to further increase factor inputs is limited es,pecially  considering the rapidly
aging population, a declining labor force in the future,2 and the constraints in natural
resources.
Second,  past  TFP  growth was  attributable to  efficiency gains  from  market-oriented
reforms  and initial  integration with  the  global  economy which  will  continue  to  be
important for future growth.  Many of the "easy" reforms were implemented and the
initial efficiency gains have been obtained.  Next stage of TFP growth may involve more
painful reforms.  Moreover, efficiency gains due to reform are often one-shot gains and
will eventually level off.  Past TFP growth may be in the nature of a catching-up with
technologies obtained from imitation.  The imitation-based TFP growth is unlikely to
persist over time. Further productivity growth would depend very much on two things:
First, whether China can improve allocative efficiency by continuing reforms in the state
and financial sectors, and by further global integration and allowing freer factor mobility
across sectors, rural-urban, state and nonstate, etc.  Second, whether China is  able to
transform itself from an imitation-based economy to  an innovation-oriented economy,
and continue its progress on industrial upgrading.
Third, investing in human capital has immense potential in contributing to productivity
growth and welfare. However, the declined growth rate of human capital accumulation is
a matter of concem, especially considering China's need for building an innovation-based
knowledge  economy.  Funding  for  basic  education  is  unevenly  distributed  and
insufficient in some poor regions. 21 Government spending on education as a ratio of
GDP has been stagnated since 1984.  Even though private finaiicing is rising in some
cities, its availability is not distributed evenly. The distribution of educational funding is
more skewed if  the availability of private financing is taken into account.  Therefore,
China needs to address its insufficient and uneven distribution of educational investment
urgently, if China is to sustain its growth and welfare improvement in the next decade.
20  See Wang et al  (2001) for implication of population aging and declining labor force on growth and
pension system reform.
This will be the topic  of our next research.  Preliminary  analysis  using the standard  deviation  and gini
indexes of education show a widening regional disparity in educational attainment across provinces.
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